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Abstract
We investigate experimentally the possibility of cooperation in a sequential prisoners' 
dilemma game under the conditions identified by Nishihara (1997). He shows for (a 
subclass of) n-person prisoners' dilemma games that when players move sequentially, but 
the order of moves is not known, full cooperation can be attained in a Nash equilibrium 
under an information structure allowing for trigger strategies. In our experiments, we find 
that subjects do not coordinate frequently on the payoff dominant equilibrium identified 
by Nishihara. Moreover, cooperation is more frequent in the same sequential game 
played with a known order of moves. We relate this theoretically contraintuitive 
observation to the role of reciprocity.
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1 Introduction
When the order of moves is known to the players in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game, 
the only rational choice of a player moving as the last one in the sequence is to freeride. 
Consequently, the play of the game unravels and cooperation cannot be sustained in an 
equilibrium. Nishihara (1997) shows that under certain information and payoff structure 
of the game, when the order of moves in which players move is not known, players can 
use trigger strategies under which cooperation can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in 
the sequential prisoners’ dilemma game.
In this paper, we use the experimental method to study this innovative view on the 
dilemma of cooperation, and we address two points. First, the game introduced by Nishi- 
hara (1997) has multiple equilibria. We therefore investigate experimentally whether the 
attractive payoff dominant equilibrium with cooperation has not only a normative but also 
a descriptive appeal. Second, the game provides players with just enough information to 
enable the use of trigger strategies in an equilibrium. We argue that the information re­
moved from the game, but available in the sequential version of the game, is relevant 
when reciprocity plays a role among the game players. In particular, when individual 
preferences are private information, but it is known that some players hold preferences 
for reciprocity, the information on the order of move could generate strategic incentives 
for cooperation in the spirit of explaining cooperation in a finitely repeated 2-person’s 
prisoner ’s dilemma by Kreps et al. (1982). Consequently, even if the game innovation 
proposed by Nishihara (1997) is not conductive to cooperation (when players do not select 
the cooperative equilibrium), the standard sequential game might be, due to the strategic 
response of some players to the possibility of a reciprocal behavior by others.
An experimental investigation of the Nishihara’s model is at hand as the information 
and payoff conditions identified by the author are intuitive and their appeal for explaining 
rational cooperation in the identified subclass of sequential prisoners’ dilemma games is 
therefore large. With respect to information structure, it is assumed that players know 
that the order of moves is randomly assigned so that every ordering is equally likely, but 
they do not learn the actual order in which they move. When asked to choose an action,
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a player only observes whether someone chose the freerider’s action before his/her move, 
or not. Consequently, players cannot distinguish states in which (i) nobody has chosen an 
action in the game yet; (ii) some players have already chosen an action, but they all chose 
the cooperative action, or (iii) all players chose the cooperative action, and the player 
him/herself moves as the last in the sequence. With respect to the payoff structure, gains 
from full cooperation have to be sufficiently large compared to the average gains from 
freeriding (Nishihara 1997, Theorem A), or gains from cooperation have to be convex and 
gains from defection concave in the number of cooperators (Nishihara 1997, Proposition 
3).
When the conditions described above are satisfied, players can use trigger strategies 
that prescribe the cooperative action unless a player reaches an information set according 
to which someone has already chosen the free-rider’s action. In that case, the deciding 
player chooses the freerider’s action as well. If the expected payoff from cooperation 
(taking into account the probability of each order of players being the same) is greater 
than the expected payoff from triggering the freeriding, then cooperation can be sustained 
in a Nash equilibrium of the game. Of course, the equilibrium without any cooperation 
is still feasible as well.
The conditions identified by Nishihara can apply to a range of real-life situations in 
which individuals sequentially take actions in a social dilemma. The decision whether 
to litter the street, or to take illegally an emergency lane on the highway may serve as 
examples. In both cases, an individual cannot asses whether a clean street or the part 
of the free highway in sight are due to the full cooperation of all players moving in the 
game before him/her, or whether he/she is the first player to move. However, a freerider’s 
action is easily observed (dirty street, clogging emergency lane) and can promptly lead to 
unravelling of cooperation. Moreover, the benefits from freeriding decrease fast with the 
number of other freeriders, just as is assumed above.
In this paper, we report experiments on a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game satis­
fying Nishihara’s payoff conditions. Each experiment participant is exposed both to this 
game with an unknown order of moves, as assumed by Nishihara, and to the game with 
the same payoff structure but with a known order of moves. D ata on the subjects’ behav­
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ior in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with the known order of moves allows us to 
separate the equilibrium selection explanations of behavior in the Nishihara’s game from 
the explanations related to the preferences for reciprocity, and to evaluate the behavioral 
relevance of the trigger strategy equilibrium in both cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theory and hypotheses are 
explained in section 2. Section 3 discusses the experiment design and our observations. 
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory and hypotheses
The game we study is an n-person sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with players i =  
1, ...,n , n >  2, and with payoff function f^ a^ k ) where ai G {C , D }, and k G {1, ...,n  — 
1} is the number of other players choosing the action C. We refer to action C  as the 
"cooperative" action, and to action D as the "freerider’s" action. It is assumed that for 
i =  1,.., n, it holds:
(i) f i ( C |k) <  f i (Dlk)  for any k =  0, ...,n  — 1;
(ii) fi(C |n  — 1) >  fi(D |0);
(iii) f i (C|k) and f i (D|k) are increasing in k;
The game with the payoff function f i (ai |k) satisfying (i)-(iii) is a prisoners’ dilemma 
game: (i) it has strictly dominant strategy D;(ii) full cooperation is Pareto efficient; (iii) 
choosing action C  imposes positive externality on all players.
The game is played sequentially and we will focus on the equilibrium predictions for 
two possible information structures of the game: the structure proposed by Nishihara 
(1997), denoting the game with such a structure by Gn , and a sequential move game with 
a known order of moves, denoted by G s . In the game Gn , the order of moves in which 
players move is assigned randomly in such a way that every possible ordering of players 
in the game is equally likely, and the order of moves is not known to the players. In the 
game G s , the order of moves is common knowledge among the players. In each move, a 
player knows how many players have decided before him/her.
Additionally, we assume for comparability reasons that in both games, Gn  and G s , 
a player asked to choose an action can only distinguish whether someone has chosen the
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action D before or not, but not how many players did so. Let us denote the information 
set at which nobody has chosen action D before by Iq , and denote the complementary 
information set at which somebody has already chosen action D before by I d .
In the game Gn , subjects can distinguish only between these two information sets, 
Iq and I d . Hence, a pure strategy in the Gn game is a pair a  =  (<tq, a D) where ctq 
is chosen in the information Iq  , and a D is chosen in the complementary information set 
Id . The strategy of a player i in the game G s may additionally also depend on the order 
of move o(i) G {1, 2, ...,n }, assigned the player, a  =  (a 1, (aQ, aD ), ....,(aQ, a D)) . Note; 
in particular, that a player in the game G s either knows that he/she is the first one to 
move in the game and all players are yet to choose their actions, or that at least one 
player moving before him/her chose action D; or, that all players moving before him/her 
chose action C . This is different from a usual sequential game, where each player not only 
knows how many players have made their decision before, but also all the decisions they 
have made. In our game G s, we restricted the information to facilitate the comparison 
with the game Gn .
Due to the information on the order of move, backwards induction excludes rational 
cooperation along an equilibrium path in the game G s . Contrary to this, Nishihara shows 
(Nishihara (1997), Theorem A) that when the order of moves is not known to the players, 
and every player ordering is equally likely, and condition (*) f i (C|n — 1) >  ¡  f i (D|k) 
for all i =  1,..., n, is satisfied, then full cooperation is a Nash equilibrium in the game Gn . 
The cooperation can be sustained by the following trigger strategy a * =  (C, D): player 
i chooses action C  if the information set he/she reached is one at which nobody choose 
action D until his/her move; and chooses action D otherwise. To see this, it is sufficient 
to show that no player has an incentive to deviate from action C  in the information set Iq . 
If player i obeys the trigger strategy, then his/her payoff will be f i (C|n — 1). If he chooses 
action D, then he triggers action D to be chosen by all players ordered in the game after 
him, i.e. the if his order of move is m =  1,..., n, then the payoff he’ll receive is f i (D|m  — 1), 
resulting in expected payoff from deviating from the trigger strategy ¡=0 f i (D|k). The 
player has no motivation to deviate as long as f i (C|n — 1) >  ¡¡ f i (D|k) for all 
i =  1, ...,n , i.e. if the condition (*) is satisfied.
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In the experiment, we parametrize the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game satisfying 
Nishihara’s condition (*) as a five-player game, n =  5. It is induced from the payoff 
function pi (xi, k) =  (k +  x i)2 +  10(1 — x i), for i =  1,..., 5 where k =  1, 2, 3,4 is the number 
of other players choosing C. Then, the payoff function of the game we study in this paper 
is given by f i (C, k) =  pi (1,k) and f i (D ,k) =  pi (0,k). This payoff function satisfies the 
condition ( * )1, as well as conditions (i), (ii) and (iii).
The game G n has two types of equilibria: one resulting in full cooperation, where all 
players use the trigger strategy a * =  (C, D), and one resulting in no cooperation, where 
all players use the strategy a D =  (D, D ).2 The first one, referred hereafter as "cooperative 
", gives a higher payoff to all players than the second one, referred to as "uncooperative". 
Therefore, payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection argument favors the cooperative 
equilibrium. Our discussion so far assumes that the game and its payoffs fully represent 
the players’ preferences, i.e. that the game is played by rational and payoff-maximizing 
subjects. Assuming rational and payoff maximizing players only, however, would amount 
to ignoring a vast experimental evidence that human subjects, interacting in a given game, 
care not only for own material payoffs but also for material payoffs of their co-players. 
In order to focus on the equilibrium selection process in the game G n , we first identify 
the subset of the experimental subjects who reveal to act as rational money-maximizers. 
These are the subjects who behave rationally in the game G s , choosing action D at each 
information set. Do these rational subjects select the payoff dominant equilibrium in the 
game Gn ? We formulate the following hypothesis:
E q u ilib riu m  se lection  h ypoth esis: Rational m oney-m axim izing subjects select 
an equilibrium in  the game Gn guided by the payoff dominance criterion. They play 
the strategy a * =  (C, D).
*It holds: f i (C |n — 1) =  25 and ^ f i ^ k )  = 16, so that fi(C[n — 1) > ^ f i ^ k ) .
2There are only these two equilibria, a* and aD, in the game Gn  , if the conditions (i)-(iii) below are 
satisfied. Let m be the number of players who choose a* other than player i, and P .i^* ^ ) , or Fi(aD|m) 
is the expected payoff of player i when he chooses a*, or aD, respectively, in that situation.
(i) Fi(a*|0) < F i(a D|0),
(ii) Fi(a*\n — 1) > Fi(aD\n — 1),
(iii) Fi(a*\m) — Fi(aD|m) is increasing in rn.
These conditions are satisfied by our experimental parametrization.
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Two issues have to be discussed in relation to this hypothesis. While payoff dominance 
may seem an attractive rational equilibrium criterion, it has often been defeated in the 
presence of strategic risk. Previous experimental evidence shows that even in simple two- 
player coordination games, strategic risk (e.g. measured by risk dominance, see Harsanyi 
and Selten, 1988) intervenes with the equilibrium selection and defeats the payoff domi­
nant equilibrium (see e.g. Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990, Berninghaus et al. 2000, 
Cabrales et al. 2000). Besides strategic risk, complexity might also affect the attraction 
of the trigger-strategy equilibrium in the game Gn . Subjects are expected to evaluate the 
expected payoffs from each of the possible strategies, in order to find the trigger strategy 
to be the most attractive choice. In an experimental setup, unlike in a theoretical analy­
sis, subjects might be prone to calculation or implementation mistakes, both resulting in 
a lower likelihood of the trigger strategy equilibrium. Whatever the underlying reasons, 
the game G n can be seen as a solution to the social dilemma the players face only if they 
indeed (frequently) select to play the cooperative equilibrium. We put the equilibrium 
selection hypothesis to an empirical test.
Addressing the role of the information in the game Gn , we further discuss the behavior 
of the subset of subjects choosing (at least at some occasions) a strategy different from 
the strategy (D, (D, D ) , ..., (D, D)) in the game G s . If the game the experimental subjects 
play is not described in terms of preference orderings, but merely in terms of monetary 
outcomes, as it usually is the case in experimental studies, then pro-social preferences held 
by some players may affect the play of the game. We therefore need to address the effect 
of pro-social preferences on the play of the cooperative equilibrium in the game Gn . One 
pervasive behavioral regularity which is relevant here is the propensity to reciprocate pos­
itively to actions of players who benefited the reciprocator, and negatively to actions that 
hurt the reciprocator.3 Positive reciprocity implies the use of action C  in the information 
set I q ; negative reciprocity the use of action D in the information set I d , independent of 
whether such strategy maximizes the player’s material payoff.4
3For a seminal paper reporting positive reciprocity in an experiment, see Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 
(1995), for negative reciprocity, see Fehr and Gaechter (2000).
Reciprocity is thus idetified with a trigger-type startegy in the game Gs , a = (aQ, (aQ,a2D) 
...., (aQ ,aD)) = (C, (C, D), ...(C, D), (C,D)), which starts-off by cooperation, and prescribes to use of
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In theory, the information structure of the game G ^ creates a possibility of rational 
cooperation. At the same time, the information on the order of moves, not available in 
the game G ^ , prevents identification of situations meriting positive reciprocity. When a 
player is ordered as a second or later player in the game G s , he/she knows for sure that 
this information set I q has been reached thanks to the cooperation of the players ranked 
before him/her. In the game G ^ , when a player has reached the information set I q , he/she 
might be ordered as first in the sequence, and hence obtain no incentives for positive 
reciprocity. In this way, removing information on the order of move in the game G ^ 
dilutes the incentives for positive reciprocity at the information set I q . More importantly, 
the missing information on the order of moves in the game G ^ is also crucial for generating 
strategic incentives to cooperate in the game G s for the money-maximizing subjects. Such 
incentives arise when preferences are private information, and reciprocators are known to 
populate the game with a sufficiently high probability. To demonstrate this point, let 
us assume that the players of the 5-player game G s implemented in the experiment are 
drawn from a population from which contains a fraction r G (0,1) of reciprocal players, 
and a fraction (1 — r) of money-maximizing players. Reciprocal players use the strategy 
a  =  (aQ, (aQ ,aD )....,(aQ ,aD )) =  (C, (C, D ) , ..., (C ,D )) in the game G s : they always 
choose action C  in the information set I q , even if ordered as last. Money-maximizing 
players choose action C  or D depending on which gives them a higher expected payoff. 
The population composition is common knowledge.
L em m a 1 I f  the fraction  r G (0,1) o f reciprocators in  the population exceeds a certain 
threshold, r >  1, m oney-m axim izing players will choose action  C  in  the in form ation set 
Iq in  the game G s up to the order o f move t  =  4. Otherwise, they choose action D .
P ro of. Let us analyze the optimal choice of a money-maximizer by backwards in­
duction. Such a player will always choose D at the order of move t =  5. If ordered at 
t =  4, and upon reaching information set Iq , money-maximizer weakly prefers action C  
to action D iff 19 <  25r +  16(1 — r) i.e. r >  | .
action C unless a subjects has previously observed action D at any moment in the game.
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•  Assuming that r <  1, and upon reaching information set I q , money-maximizer 
prefers action C  to action D if ordered at
— t =  3, iff 14 <  9(1 — r) +  r[25r +  16(1 — r)] i.e. r >  +15+v^ô5 >  i . so that a 
money-maximizer will always choose D at t =  3 when r <  1.
— t =  2, iff 11 <  4(1 — r) +  r[9(1 — r) +  r[25r +  16(1 — r)]]; where the resulting 
polynomial of the 3rd order has one real root, and implies a threshold value for 
the satisfaction of the inequality r >  0.6122... >  | ; so that a money-maximizer 
will always choose D at t =  2 when r <  | .
— t =  1, iff 10 <  (1 — r) +  r[4(1 — r) +  r[9(1 — r) +  r[25r +  16(1 — r)]]]; where 
the resulting polynomial of 4ift order has one real root, and implies a threshold 
value for the satisfaction of the inequality r >  0.933... >  | ; so that a money- 
maximizer will always choose D at t =  1 when r <  | .
•  Assuming that r >  I > and upon reaching information set I q, a money-maximizer 
will prefer action C  to action D if ordered at t =  3, 2, 1 because the payoff from 
choosing D at t =  3, 2,1 equals to 14, 11, 10, respectively, and is lower than the 
expected payoff from choosing C, equal to 25r +  16(1 — r) >  19 for r >  | .
Hence, the information on the order of move available in the game G s gives incen­
tives to the money-maximizing rational players to choose the cooperative action C  in the 
information set I q if they believe that the population consists of sufficiently many recip­
rocal players. This threshold, implied in the experiment parametrization, is conductive 
to holding such beliefs5.
R ec ip ro c ity  h ypoth esis: In  the game G s , reciprocal subjects play the strategy a  =  
(aQ, (aQ ,aD  ) ...., (aQ, aD)) =  (C, (C, D), ...(C, D), (C ,D )), and m oney-m axim izers  
respond strategically to the presence o f reciprocators by playing the strategy, a  =  
(aQ, (aQ ,aD ),...., (aQ ,aD)) =  (C, (C, D ) , ..., (C, D), (D, D)).
5In experimental studies, the propensity to reciprocate positively is frequently observed among par­
ticipants, see e.g. Fischbacher et al. (2001) who find that half of their subject pool uses strategies 
corresponding to positive reciprocity.
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Consequently, we expect that at least some cooperation will be observed in the game 
G s . This cooperation will be driven by the presence of reciprocators, expressing their 
preferences for (positive) reciprocity when asked to choose an action in the information 
set Iq . This cooperation will also be driven by money-maximizors, with strategic incentives 
to sustain cooperation in the presence of reciprocators.
The presence and belief in reciprocity has thus impact on the extent of cooperation 
in the game G s . Does the presence of reciprocators also affect behavior in the game G ^ ? 
Reciprocal players will simply follow their preferences, and therefore play strategy (C, D) 
in the game G ^ , just as they would reciprocate in the game G s . So, the main question 
is whether the money-maximizing subjects are affected by the presence of reciprocators 
when choosing which of the two equilibria to play. Reciprocators use the strategy (C, D) 
in the game G ^ with probability 1. This alleviates the equilibrium selection problem 
in the game G ^ in the sense that the number of the players coordinating between the 
cooperative and the uncooperative equilibrium decreases from the number of all players 
of the game to the number of the money-maximizors. The equilibrium selection problem 
disappears only if a strategic money-maximizing player believes that all other subjects are 
reciprocal - an unlikely situation. The equilibrium selection problem remains relevant in 
the presence of reciprocators as soon as at least one other player in the game is believed to 
be a money-maximizer, seeking to choose the payoff-maximizing strategy in a coordination 
game with other money-maximizing player(s).
In short, the presence of reciprocators alleviates, but does not remove the coordination 
problem faced by the money-maximizers in the game G ^ . At the same time, the presence 
of reciprocators in the game Gs  generates incentives to choose action C  in the information 
set I q for the money-maximizers with beliefs in sufficiently many reciprocators in the 
population.
In the light of the discussion above, we argue that the impact of imposing the infor­
mation structure of the game G ^ in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game on the play­
ers’ ability to cooperate is not necessarily positive. For one, rational money-maximizing 
players face an equilibrium selection problem in the game G ^ , also when accounting 
for the presence for some reciprocators. Second, removing information on the order of
10
Session Treatment Number of participants Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20
S1 T^ s 15 GW G s
S2 T^ s 20 GW G s
S3 T^ s 20 GW G s
S4 Tsw 20 G s g n
S5 Tsw 20 G s G ^
Table 1: Session Table.
moves available in the game G s , and transforming it into the information structure of the 
game G ^ , negatively affects both strategic and nonstrategic incentives to cooperate. The 
money-maximizers lack the strategic incentives to sustain the cooperation in the game 
G ^ because they lack the ability to signal that an information set I q has been reached 
in an order of move higher than 1, but they have strategic incentives to cooperate if they 
believe sufficiently many reciprocators populate the game G s. And, reciprocators in the 
game G ^ lack the information on the extent of the previous cooperation, which would 
give them nonstrategic, preference-driven incentives to cooperate. Such information is 
available in the game Gs.
In the following section, we address the extent of cooperation and impact of reciprocity 
in both games, G ^  and G s , using our experimental data. Ultimately, we ask which of the 
two information structures - of the game G ^ or the game G s - is empirically revealed as 
more suitable for sustaining cooperation in the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game.
3 Experim ent design and analysis
We report data on 95 student participants. The experiments took place in the CentERlab 
at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, and were computerized using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007).6 Each session lasted about 1,5 hours and subjects earned 3 Euro 
participation fee plus on average 9 Euro.
In the experiment, subjects participated in two tasks, each consisting of 10 rounds 
of the sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma game. We randomly re-matched groups after 
each round. At the beginning of an experimental session, we first read instructions for
instructions, computer screenshots, and software are available from the authors upon request.
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Number of others choosing C If I choose ...
... C ... D
0 1 10
1 4 11
2 9 14
3 16 19
4 25 26
Table 2: Payoff Table.
Task 1 (students knew that there is also Task 2 but were not informed its content until 
it started). Then, students answered a written test with understanding questions. After 
checking these for correctness, we run Task 1. We then repeated the same sequence of 
events for Task 2. In the experiment, we implemented two sequential-move prisoner’s 
dilemma games, GV and G s . In each of them, five subjects were randomly assigned the 
order of move, and sequentially prompted to choose action in the game. The information 
structure varied in these two games: in the game GV, the information structure defined 
in Nishihara (1997) was used; in the game G s , the information structure was extended 
by informing the players on the order in which they move7. Besides this difference, the 
games were kept the same. For example, a subject in each game was only informed on 
the information set he/she reached in the moment of move, Iq or Ip. The payoff function 
was presented in the form of a table, see Table 2.8
We used two experimental treatments, TsV and TVs, reversing the order in which the 
games were played and controlling thus for the order/learning effects. In the treatment 
T sV, Task 1 was game G s , while Task 2 was the game GV. In the treatment T Vs , Task 
1 was the game GV, and Task 2 was the game G s .
We start analyzing our data by summarizing the action choices in both games, and
7In order to disguise the order of move of a player in the game Gn  , we used a sequence of screens 
in which subjects were asked to click on the screen using their mouse, but only some of these screens 
were identified as "Decision Screens" and represented a decision in a given round of the game. Moreover, 
we never announced the start of a new round, so that when a subject was asked to make a decision, 
an unknown number of other subjects could have already made decisions before this subject. Based on 
our post-experiment debriefing with the students, we believe that we managed to achieve our goal to 
implement a game with an unknown order of moves.
8The experiment exchange rate was 1 point=4 Eurocents. Subjects were paid for all decisions they 
made in the experiment.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Action C Choices per Game and per Period.
discussing the individual subject strategies. We then support our findings by a regres­
sion analysis. To start with, we present Figure 1 with the information on the average 
occurrence of the cooperative action C in the game G s and GV over time. This figure 
motivates further discussion, as cooperation seems to be more frequent, and to unravel 
less over time, in the game G s than in the game GV. Let us discuss the data in a more 
detail, though.
The information on the occurrence of the cooperative action G in both games, per 
treatment and per information set can be found in Table 3. Based on this data, we observe 
that: (i) subjects condition the choice of action C on the information set: controlling for 
the treatment and the game, choosing action C is always more likely in the information 
set /c  than in the information set / d . This suggests that the action C choices are more 
than mere errors. And, (ii) within a treatment, subjects are more likely to choose action 
C upon reaching the information set C when they do have information on the order in 
which they move, in the game G s , than under the information structure of the game GV.
One puzzling observation in our data at the first sight is the difference in the levels 
of cooperation across the treatments, see Table 3. In any information set, subjects are 
observed to cooperate more frequently in the treatment TVs than in the treatment TsV •
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Game Treatment Information set Id Information set Iç
G s Tsv 16/295 (5%) 25/105 (24%)
GV Tsv 6/304 (2%) 16/96 (17%)
G s Tv s 36/362 (10%) 86/188 (46%)
GV Tv s 30/405 (7%) 35/145 (24%)
Table 3: Frequency of the Action C Choices per Information Set, Game and Treatment.
In both treatments, however, more cooperation in the information set /ç  is found in the 
game G s than in the game GV. The level difference of cooperation seems therefore to be 
merely a sampling effect, due to the number of observations we have. Can we support 
this suggestion?
Indeed, more light can be shed on the differences in the level of cooperation across 
treatments by looking more closely at the behavior in the game G s . In the reciprocity 
hypothesis, we argued that cooperation will decrease abruptly at the end of a game, 
because strategic money-maximizers have no incentives to cooperate when ordered as the 
last. Only the reciprocators choose action G in the information set / ç  when ordered as 
last in the game G s . Indeed, the cooperation decreases for the players ordered in the 
second half of the game, see Figure 2.9 But, cooperation rates remain strictly positive in 
the last order of move in the treatment TVs, while they are equal to zero in the treatment 
TsV. This supports the idea that subjects sampled for the treatment TVs were more likely 
to be conditionally cooperative, and willing to cooperate also in the last order of move, 
when all strategic incentives to cooperate were foregone. Note that the sampling effect 
does not prevent us from evaluating the willingness of the subjects to cooperate in either 
of the game - by controlling for the treatment. We do that in the regression analysis 
presented later in this section.
Returning back to the Table 3, conditioning of the action G choice on the reached 
information set resembles the use of trigger strategies, which could sustain the coopera-
9The maximal willingness to cooperate is not obtained at the first order of move, as predicted by the 
reciprocity hypothesis, but between the order of move 3 and 4. The initial increase of cooperation is 
thus not correctly captured by the reciprocity hypothesis. Lacking to predict the non-linear pattern of 
cooperation rates, visible in Figure 2, is likely due to the simple form of static expectations we postulated 
for the money-maximizers. If, for example, money-maximizers, upon observing others’ cooperation in 
the early moves in the game, update their beliefs about the presence of reciprocators, then cooperation 
rates could increase first, before dropping down.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Action C Choices in the Game Gs per Order of Move and per 
Treatm ent.
tive play in the game G ^  in theory. However, cooperation - and trigger strategies - occur 
not only in the game G ^ , bu t also in the game G s , where rational cooperation is ex­
cluded by backwards induction. This finding is systematic. On an individual level, across 
treatm ents, 34/95 (36%) of subjects use consistently trigger strategies in the game G s , 
and 24/95 (25%) in the game G ^ . In other words - conditioning the action chosen on the 
information set reached is not found in the game G ^  only, bu t is also applied by numerous 
subjects in the  game G s .
Having found cooperation - and trigger-type of strategies - bo th  in the game G ^ and 
G s , we proceed now to  evaluate first the way in which rational subjects choose between the 
cooperative and the uncooperative equilibrium in the game G ^ . Afterwards, we address 
the comparison of the two informations structures, of the game G ^ and G s , w ith respect 
to  their ability to  support cooperation.
In order to  test the  rational equilibrium selection hypothesis conservatively, we focus 
for now only on the  subset of the subjects who reveal to  be pure money-maximizers in the 
game G s . These are the subjects whose behavior can be captured by the model proposed 
by Nishihara (1997). W hen identifying such subjects, we use the fact they are bound to 
always choose action D in the game G s , independent of the order of move and /o r actions
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Treatment Always D in Gs Sometimes C in Gs
Always D in Gw Sometimes C in Gw Always D in Gw Sometimes C in Gw Total
Tws 15 2 15 23 55
Tsw 15 3 14 8 40
Table 4: Number of Experiment Participants per Strategy and Treatm ent.
chosen by other players of the game. In our dataset, these are 17/55 (31%) and 18/40 
(45%) subjects in the treatm ent TVs and Tsw, respectively (see Table 4). We now ask 
whether these rational subjects select the cooperative equilibrium proposed by Nishihara 
(1997) in the game Gw. Disappointingly, only very few do so: 2/17 (12%) and 3/18 (17%) 
in treatm ent TVs and TsV, respectively; the remaining subjects always play D in the game 
Gw. This leads us to  the conclusion th a t the rational money-maximizing subjects do not 
play the payoff dominant equilibrium, allowing us to  we reject the equilibrium selection 
hypothesis.
Observation (E q u ilib r iu m  se le c tio n )  Among subjects reveling to  maximize their material 
payoffs (in the game G s), only very few, less than  15%, choose the  cooperative and 
payoff dominant equilibrium of the game Gw.
We now proceed by investigating the behavior of the remaining players, those who 
choose action C (on at least on some occasions) in the game G s. Among them , we 
actually find a higher number of individuals cooperating in the information set / ^  more 
frequently in the game Gs than  in the game Gw (see Table 5, where this is the case for 
23/55 (42%) vs. 17/55 (31%) of the subjects in the treatm ent TVs , and for 15/40 (38%) 
vs. 10/40 (25%) of the  subjects in the treatm ent TsV). Notably, a nonegligible fraction of 
subjects (in particular 15/55 (27%), and 14/40 (35%) subjects in the treatm ent TVs and 
TsV, respectively, see Table 4) always choose D in the game Gw, but they do cooperate 
at least on some occasions in the game G s . The game with the known order of moves Gs 
seems to  support cooperation in a higher number of individuals than  the game Gw.
These individual strategy findings can be complemented by a regression analysis in 
the form of a logit model explaining the action C choices, while accounting for individual 
random  effects, see Table 6.10 Based on it, the  action C is significantly more likely to
10Treatment T^s  equals 1 for the the treatment T^s  and equals 0 otherwise; Ic  equals 1 in the
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Treatment Number of C choices in / c  
higher or equal
in Gw as compared to Gs 
strictly lower
Never C choice Total
Tws 17/55 (31%) 23/55 (42%) 15/55 (27%) 55 (100%)
Tsw 10/40 (25%) 15/40 (38%) 15/40 (38%) 40 (100%)
Table 5: Comparision of Action C Choices in the information set Ic of an Experiment 
Participant, per Treatm ent.
be chosen in the information set /^  in bo th  games, Gw and G s (see the positive and 
significant coefficient on the variable indicating the information set / ^  in the columns 2 
and 4, respectively). This supports the significance of the trigger strategy in bo th  games, 
not only in the game Gw .11
Most importantly, though, we can use the regression analysis to  evaluate the overall 
contribution of the information set-up of the game Gw to  the cooperation in the sequen­
tial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find the the interaction term  /^  * G am eG w in column 
6, in a regression merging the d a ta  on both  games, to  be negative and significant. After 
controlling for possible treatm ent effects, sampling effects and the period of interaction, 
the conclusion of the regression analysis is thus not favorable to  the plan to  create cooper­
ation opportunities by transform ing the  game Gs into the game Gw. The cooperation in 
the information set / ^  is less likely in the game Gw than  in the game G s , implying tha t 
the  potential increase in cooperation due the  information removed from the game Gs, by 
creating information structure of the game Gw, as suggested by the theory, is empirically 
not supported.
Observation (R e c ip ro c ity )  Reciprocity is frequent and affects behavior in the game G s . (i) 
On an individual level, between one quarter and one th ird  of subjects use consis­
tently  trigger-like strategies, conditioning on the informations et reached in a game.
information set I c , and 0 in the information set Ip ; Period ranges from 1 to 10; Order attains the value 
of the order in which a subject moves in the game Gs , and attains value 0 in the game Gn  ■
n The treatment variable TNs is significant in both games as well (see columns 2-3 and 4-5), with more 
unconditional cooperation found in the game implemented as Task 1 (see the positive and significant 
effect on the variable Treatment TNs for the data from the game GN , in column 2, and the negative 
and significant coefficient on the variable Treatment TNs for the data from the game Gs). This reveals 
that subjects are more willing to cooperate, independent of the information set reached, when they play 
a game as the first in the experiment. Subjects obviously have to learn to play the games, and they 
make more mistakes by cooperating unconditionally at the start of the experiment, than later in the 
experiment.
17
Data Game Gw Game Gs Both games
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err
Game Gw 0.366 0.287
Treatment Tws 2.263*** 0.752 -2.283*** 0.770 0.952*** 0.319
/ C 2.511*** 0.552 3.207*** 0.093 3.422*** 0.275
/^*Treatment Tws -0.795 0.633 2.739*** 0.658
/^*Game Gw -1.621*** 0.369
Period -0.138 0.100 -0.219*** 0.073 -0.140*** 0.030
Period*Treatment Tws -0.155 0.112 0.201** 0.093
Order 2.071*** 0.537
Order*Order -0.294*** 0.091
Constant -3.952*** 0.684 -5.939*** 0.961 -3.725*** 0.369
N 950 950 1900
Log likelihood -234.198 -263.512 -529.346
*sig.level 10%; **sig.level 5%; ***sig.level 1%
Table 6: Logit Model Explaining Action C Choices.
(ii) Upon reaching the information set / ^ , subjects cooperate more frequently in 
the game G s , w ith the know order of move, than  in the game Gw, w ithout the 
information on the order of move.
In summary, bo th  individual strategies and regression analysis show th a t cooperation 
is more likely in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game with a known order of moves 
G s , than  in the game w ith possible rational cooperation Gw. There may be environments 
which prom ote coordination more than  the one used in our experim ental design, and hence 
it is an open question whether rational subjects can learn to  coordinate on the payoff 
dominant equilibrium in the game Gw. At the same time, the information structure of 
the  game G s proves to  have advantages related to  the  strategic behavior in the  presence 
of reciprocity.
4 Conclusions
Cooperation in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game can be obtained in a Nash equi­
librium if the game satisfies the payoff and information conditions identified by Nishihara 
(1997). The order of moves in the  game is assumed to  be randomly assigned, and not 
known to the  players. This construction, together w ith a restriction on the payoff function,
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guarantees th a t trigger strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. We implement a game 
satisfying the conditions identified by Nishihara (1997) in an experim ental laboratory, and 
observe the behavior of subjects in this game, as well as in a game with the same payoff 
function and with the known order of moves. We analyze the d a ta  separately for subjects 
who reveal to  behave as rational payoff-maximizers, as well as for subjects who reveal 
to  hold preferences and /o r believe in preferences for reciprocity in others. In short, the 
first point we make in this paper is on a behavioral validation of the  rational equilibrium 
selection of the cooperative equilibrium in the game introduced by Nishihara (1997). The 
second point we make can be seen as a behavioral robustness check, allowing for some 
uncertainty about others’ preferences being fully captured by the m aterial payoffs of the 
game.
On the first subset of our data, we find th a t cooperation is scarce in the game with 
the unknown order of moves Gw among the rational players. Hence, we reject the payoff 
dominance as the  equilibrium selection criterion. This conclusion raises questions about 
the behavioral relevance of the cooperative equilibrium in the game Gw. A future research 
is needed to  study environments supporting the coordination on the  payoff dominant 
equilibrium among the rational, money-maximizing players (e.g. communication). On 
the second subset of our data, when analyzing the behavior in the game w ith the known 
order of moves, we often observe the use of the trigger strategies. Subjects seem to  behave 
consistent w ith positive reciprocity and /o r belief in positive reciprocity.
Finally, the overall effect is not favorable for the innovative solution to  the social 
dilemma problem proposed in Nishihara (1997). The cooperation rates are higher in the 
sequential prisoners’ dilemma game w ith the known order of moves than  in the game 
without the know order of moves. We consider our experim ental observations instructive 
in th a t a theoretically interesting result w ith respect to  the possibility of cooperation 
among rational players is in contrast w ith the actual play of the game, when the game 
outcomes implementing the game do not represent players ’preferences, bu t only the 
economic outcomes from the  game.
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